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Abstract: This article challenges the 
common view that improvements in 
critical thinking are best pursued by 
investigations in informal logic. 
From the perspective of research in 
psychology and neuroscience, hu-
man inference is a process that is 
multimodal, parallel, and often emo-
tional, which makes it unlike the 
linguistic, serial, and narrowly cog-
nitive structure of arguments. At-
tempts to improve inferential prac-
tice need to consider psychological 
error tendencies, which are patterns 
of thinking that are natural for peo-
ple but frequently lead to mistakes in 
judgment. This article discusses two 
important but neglected error ten-
dencies: motivated inference and 
fear-driven inference.  
 
 
Résumé: Nous mettons en question 
le point de vue courant que 
l’amélioration de la pensée critique 
se réalise le mieux par 
l’enseignement de la logique non 
formelle. Selon les recherches en 
psychologie et en neuroscience, 
l’inférence consiste de plusieurs 
procédés parallèles souvent affectifs, 
ce qui diffère de la structure cogni-
tive linguistique, successive, et 
étroite des arguments. Les tentatives 
d’améliorer les inférences doivent 
tenir compte des tendances psy-
chologiques à commettre des erreurs 
qui sont le résultat des façons de 
penser naturelles qui induisent sou-
vent les gens à former des mauvais 
jugements. On discute de deux er-
reurs importantes mais négligées : 
les inférences influencées par la mo-
tivation, et celles influencées par la 
peur.  
 
Keywords: Argument, critical thinking, emotion, fear-driven inference, in-
ference, logic, motivated inference, neuroscience, psychology. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The investigation of critical thinking includes the systematic at-
tempt to improve people’s ability to form beliefs and make deci-
sions. It is widely taken for granted among philosophers that 
such improvement is best accomplished by the study of argu-
ment as pursued within the fields of formal and informal logic. 
This article draws on findings in psychology and neuroscience 
to challenge this assumption. Because human inference is very 
different from linguistic argument, we can get a better under-
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standing of the failures of thinking by attending to psychological 
processes than by analyzing logical fallacies, only a few of 
which are relevant to the kinds of thinking errors that people ac-
tually make.  
  I begin with a discussion of how, from a neurocognitive 
perspective, inference is very different from argument. I argue 
accordingly that rationality should be understood as a matter of 
making effective inferences, not just good arguments. Correla-
tively, irrationality involves making erroneous inferences for 
reasons that go well beyond the employment of fallacious argu-
ments. Rather, inferential mistakes arise from a host of psycho-
logical error tendencies (biases). This article will concentrate on 
two error tendencies that have been largely neglected in infor-
mal logic: motivated inference and fear-driven inference. The 
second of these has also been ignored in psychological discus-
sions of inferential errors, even though it is common in many 
domains such as interpersonal relationships, health, politics, and 
economics. After an assessment of the relevance of psychology 
to the enhancement of scientific literacy, I conclude with a brief 
discussion of how the study of argument can be socially useful. 
 
 
 2. Inference and argument  
When I first started teaching informal logic in the late 1970s, I 
had the common hope that I would be helping students to im-
prove their thinking. Now as then, the need for critical thinking 
is acute. A large proportion of the North American population 
believes that global warming is not a problem, that humans did 
not evolve from apes, that the moon landing was a hoax (Plait 
2002), and even that the earth is the center of the universe.  Peo-
ple also make many bad decisions, such as smoking, overeating, 
paying exorbitant interest on their credit card purchases, and 
voting for politicians who do not act in their interests. Enter-
prises such as informal logic, critical thinking, and scientific lit-
eracy aim at improving such kinds of theoretical inferences 
(about what to believe) and practical inferences (about what to 
do). I shall argue, however, that evidence from psychology and 
neuroscience reveals that standard approaches are based on mis-
conceptions about the nature of inference and argument. By 
inference I mean the activity of forming mental representations 
such as beliefs and decisions. 
  Here is what seems to me to be a common view in phi-
losophy about the relation between critical thinking and infor-
mal logic: 
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(1) arguments are the basis for belief formation and decision 
making;  
(2) good arguments are the basis of rational belief formation 
and decision making; and  
(3) fallacious arguments are the causes of defects in beliefs 
and decisions.  
These three assume that inferences are based on arguments, so 
that it should be possible to improve human inference by in-
creasing people’s ability to construct and evaluate good argu-
ments while avoiding fallacious ones. Rationality primarily in-
volves using good arguments and identifying bad ones. 
  The point of this article is to defend an alternative view 
based on evidence that inference is in fact very different from 
argument, so that critical thinking needs to proceed in ways that 
are much more informed by psychological research than by in-
formal logic. In place of fallacies, many of which are arcane and 
rarely committed by people in real situations, the study of criti-
cal thinking can consider error tendencies to which people are 
actually prone, as shown by empirical investigation.  
  In the philosophical tradition, an argument consists of a set 
of claims in which the premises offer reasons for a conclusion 
(Govier 2005; for a broader view of argument, see Johnson 
2000). Since Aristotle invented the syllogism, arguments have 
been laid out in the form of a set of sentences from which a con-
clusion is derived, either deductively with no loss of certainty or 
inductively (ampliatively). Typically, arguments are linguistic 
entities, consisting of a set of sentences that are laid out serially, 
in step by step fashion: premise 1, premise 2, … premise n; 
therefore conclusion. If inference were the same as argument, it 
would have the same serial, linguistic structure. 
  However, there is ample evidence from cognitive psychol-
ogy and neuroscience that human inference is actually parallel 
rather than serial, multimodal rather than just language-based, 
and as much emotional as cognitive. Here “parallel” means that 
the brain carries out many processes simultaneously, “multi-
modal” means that the representations used by the brain include 
non-linguistic ones such as visual images, and “emotional” 
means neural processes that integrate evaluations with physio-
logical perceptions. These expositions assume, as do almost all 
psychologists and neuroscientists, that mental processes are 
brain operations; detailed defense of this assumption can be 
found in Thagard (2010a).  
  It would take much more than an article to defend  thor-
oughly the claims that inference is parallel, multimodal, and 
emotional, but support for them can be found in any recent text-
book in cognitive psychology and cognitive science (e.g. Smith 
and Kosslyn 2007; Thagard 2005b). The fact that inference is 
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parallel rather than serial can be seen first from the operation of 
the human brain, which involves around 100 billion neurons fir-
ing asynchronously. Conscious thinking is largely serial because 
the limitations of working memory only allow people to form 
one thought at a time, but the formation of these thoughts is the 
result of a massively parallel process that integrates many 
sources of information (see e.g. Rumelhart and McClelland 
1986; Thagard 2000). 
  Some philosophical recognition of the parallel nature of 
inference is shown in the discussion of conductive arguments 
(Govier 2005), which assemble multiple sources of information.  
From a psychological perspective, all inference is conductive, 
operating in parallel to lead to the assembly of many sources of 
information into a coherent conclusion. As Gilbert Harman 
(1973) pointed out long ago, even a deductive argument does 
not suffice to justify making an inference. Believing that if p 
then q, and p, need not lead you to believe that q, if you already 
have reasons to doubt that q. In that case, you need to question 
your belief in if p then q and p, rather than blithely inferring q. 
Inference in such cases requires a more complex process of be-
lief revision based on coherence, rather than merely following 
the deductive pattern (Thagard 2000; Thagard and Findlay 
2011). 
  The sources of information that justify inferences often 
involve linguistic processing, but they also often require proc-
essing of information in multiple other modalities, including vi-
sion, sound, touch, taste, smell, and kinesthetic sensations. 
There has been some recognition of this fact in the informal log-
ic literature on visual argument (e.g. Groarke 1996), but I think 
it would be better to use the term “visual inference” rather than 
argument in order to avoid the serial, linguistic connotations of 
argument. Psychological evidence that thinking is multimodal 
can be found in the work of psychologists such as Barsalou 
(1999, 2009). 
  In inference, emotion is just as important as cognition, be-
cause the brain uses emotions to attach values to representations, 
which are crucial for decision making and even important for 
deciding which beliefs are worth forming (Thagard, 2006, 
2010a). Emotion is not just an add-on or distraction to cognition, 
but an integral part of how the brain controls the flow of infor-
mation (Clore and Palmer 2009). 
  The evidence that inference is multimodal, parallel, and 
emotional as well as cognitive has serious implications for the 
study of critical thinking. Instead of assuming that inference is 
and should be based on serial, linguistic arguments, we need to 
consider the complex processes that sometimes enable people to 
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succeed at producing reliable beliefs and effective decisions, yet 
sometimes mislead people into erroneous beliefs and disastrous 
decisions. From this perspective, rationality is not simply a mat-
ter of using good arguments and avoiding fallacious ones, but 
rather a matter of adopting patterns of thinking and behavior that 
best satisfy legitimate goals concerning what to believe and 
what to do. 
  In addition to fallacies, we need to consider inferential er-
ror tendencies: thinking patterns to which people are naturally 
prone but which often lead to false beliefs and actions contrary 
to people’s best interests. In the appendix, I list more than fifty 
such error tendencies derived from the psychological literature, 
all of which I have found relevant to teaching critical thinking. 
In this article, however, I will focus on just two error tendencies, 
motivated inference and fear-driven inference. The first of these 
is well known in the psychological literature but largely ne-
glected in philosophical treatments of critical thinking; the sec-
ond is little discussed in both psychology and philosophy, de-
spite its prevalence in erroneous thinking.  
 
 
 3. Motivated Inference  
Motivated inference occurs when people distort their judgments 
because of their underlying personal goals (Kunda, 1990, 1999). 
It is an emotional bias that undercuts rationality, and can be ob-
served in many kinds of interpersonal and practical judgments. 
It would be highly misleading to depict motivated inference as a 
sort of fallacious argument akin to wishful thinking, of the form: 
I want X, therefore X is true. Few people are that that simple-
minded, not even the proponents of the The Secret (Byrne 2006) 
who propose that just wanting something can enable you to get 
it. Motivated inference is more complex than wishful thinking 
because it involves selective recruitment and assessment of evi-
dence based on unconscious processes that are driven by emo-
tional considerations of goals rather than purely cognitive rea-
soning. 
  Here are some examples of motivated inference found in 
diverse domains: 
Romantic relationships: my lover treats me poorly, but he/she 
will change. 
Parenting: my child hates school, but will settle down and 
straighten out eventually.  
Medicine: this pain in my chest must be indigestion, not a 
heart attack. 
Politics: the new leader will be the country’s savior, bringing 
hope and change.  
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Sports: our team has been losing, but we’re going to play 
great today. 
Research: the article I’m writing is my best ever and will get 
into a top journal.  
Law: the evidence against my hero is serious, but he couldn’t 
have done it. 
Religion: life is hard, but my caring God will lead me to eter-
nal bliss.  
Economics: this rapid economic growth is a sign of a new 
kind of economy, not a bubble.  
In all of these cases, inference is based on limited evidence but 
seems plausible to people because the conclusion fits well with 
their goals such as being loved, healthy, successful, happy, or 
rich. Of course, the conclusions of motivated inference may oc-
casionally turn out to be true, because sometimes lovers do 
change, children do straighten out, and so on. But motivated in-
ference is based on wishes, not facts. 
  It would be pointless to try to capture these inferences by 
obviously fallacious arguments, because people are rarely con-
sciously aware of the biases that result from their motivations. 
Mathematical decision theory makes a sharp distinction between 
probabilities and utilities; but, in the human brain, the processes 
for assessing beliefs and values overlap substantially (Harris, 
Sheth, and Cohen 2008). Psychologists have documented many 
phenomena that are best explained by noting that emotion af-
fects people’s judgements about risk and credibility. See, for 
example Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) on risk 
as feelings, Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) on 
the affect heuristic, and Schwartz and Clore (2003) on mood as 
information. Hence motivated inference naturally results from 
unconscious mental processes, rather than from explicit reason-
ing. 
  Overcoming people’s motivated inferences is therefore 
more akin to psychotherapy than informal logic. Rather than 
laying out premises and conclusions, remediation of motivated 
inference requires identification of conscious and unconscious 
goals that can explain why people are inclined to adopt beliefs 
despite a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. For exam-
ple, I have used a psychological theory of motivated inference 
implemented as a computer model to explain the prevalence of 
religious belief (Thagard 2005a), the opposition to Darwin’s 
theory of evolution (Thagard and Findlay 2010) and the persis-
tence of skepticism about global warming (Thagard and Findlay 
2011). Because the evidence for God and the evidence against 
Darwin and global warming are insufficient to support reason-
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able belief, their attractiveness can best be explained by moti-
vated inference. 
  Due to their unconscious, parallel nature, motivated infer-
ences are often better displayed using diagrams rather than a se-
ries of statements. Figure 1 shows part of the cognitive and emo-
tional structure of the view held by right wing politicians and oil 
company executives that scientific concerns about climate 
change are exaggerated. Most scientists have concluded on the 
basis of substantial evidence that global warming is caused by 
human production of greenhouse gases, but the skeptics deny 
this interpretation of the evidence. According to the analysis in 
figure 1, this denial results, not from any identifiable argument, 
but from a mixture of evidence and emotional motivations such 
as avoiding restrictions on oil companies and limiting govern-
ment activity. Then climate change skepticism results from emo-
tional coherence, not fallacious arguments.  Hence in cases such 
as the politically-motivated denial of climate change and the re-
ligiously-motivated denial of the theory of evolution by natural 
selection, critical thinking requires a psychological understand-
ing of motivated inference more than a logical understanding of 
the structure of argument.   
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Figure 1. View of the controversy over climate change includ-
ing emotional constraints as well as explanatory ones. The solid 
lines indicate positive constraints based on explanatory relations 
and the thin dotted line indicates a negative constraint based on 
incompatibility. The thick dotted lines indicate negative emo-
tional constraints. Reprinted from Thagard and Findlay (2011).  
 
     Although there has been substantial research on motivated 
inference in psychology, it rarely is considered in textbooks on 
critical thinking and scientific literacy.  Even more neglected is 
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another kind of emotion-related inference that derives from fear 
rather than desire.  
 
 
4. Fear-Driven Inference  
 
In fear-driven inference, people believe something, not just de-
spite the fact they fear it to be true, but partly because they fear 
it to be true (Thagard and Nussbaum forthcoming). Motivated 
inference leads people to believe what they desire because it fits 
with their goals, but fear-driven inference seems paradoxical 
because people end up believing what they are afraid of. How 
can anyone be that stupid? 
  Easily. Here are important domains in which people (in-
cluding the author of this paper) sometimes succumb to fear-
driven inference.  
Romantic relationships: my lover looks distant, so he/she 
must be having an affair. 
Parenting: I haven’t heard from my teenager for a few hours, 
so he’s probably in trouble.  
Medicine: this rash means I have leprosy or some other seri-
ous disease. 
Politics: today’s tough times result from an international con-
spiracy.  
Sports: my team is hopeless. 
Research: the editor’s delay in responding to my article 
means he/she hates it.  
Law: the courts are so biased that I’m bound to be convicted. 
Religion:  it is predetermined that God will punish me eter-
nally.  
Economics: the economy is doomed to perpetual recession 
and depression.  
What I am calling “fear-driven inference” has occasionally been 
noticed before: Mele (2001) calls it “twisted self-deception”, 
and Elster (2007) calls it “countermotivated” inference. But this 
kind of inference does not seem to have been investigated by 
experimental psychologists or writers on critical thinking. 
  Fear-driven inference is doubly irrational, from both a 
practical and theoretical perspective, because it gives the thinker 
unhappiness as well as erroneous beliefs. It is even less suited to 
argument-based analysis than motivated inference, because it 
results from complex psychological processes that are emotional 
and parallel, not just linguistic, serial, and conscious. Thagard 
and Nussbaum (forthcoming) propose that fear-driven inference 
results from a process they call gut overreaction, in which an 
amplifying feedback loop between judgments and emotions can 
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lead both to excessively positive assessments and to excessively 
negative ones. Fearing that something is true (e.g. that you have 
a disease) can lead you to focus so much on the reasons for it 
(e.g. a rash, which might be transitory) that the mere arousal as-
sociated with the belief is mistaken for evidence that it is true. 
  How can people be susceptible to both motivated and fear-
driven inference? The first makes people overly optimistic, 
while the latter makes people overly pessimistic. Which direc-
tion someone is biased at a particular moment can depend on 
several factors, including personality, mood, and evidence.  
Some people may be more naturally inclined toward motivated 
inference if they have high self-esteem and a positive outlook on 
life. On the other hand, people inclined to depression and low 
self-esteem may be more inclined to fear-driven inference.   
Apart from personality factors, all people have variations in 
moods, and those in a happy mood at a moment may tend to-
ward motivated inference, while those in a negative mood may 
tend toward fear-driven inference. Finally, the accumulation of 
evidence may produce a swing from motivated inference to fear-
driven inference when people lose the ability to sustain an ex-
cessively rosy view of the world. For example, in the economic 
crisis of 2008, investors quickly switched from an overoptimis-
tic view to an excessively pessimistic one, causing a sharp drop 
in the stock market.  Going in the other direction, events such as 
the Arab spring of 2011 can lead people to swing from a pessi-
mistic view about the possibilities of democratic change towards 
an overly exuberant one concerning the possibility of revolution.  
  Thagard and Nussbaum (forthcoming) conjecture that 
fear-driven inference arises for much the same reasons as moti-
vated inference.  In the brain, there is no firewall between cogni-
tion and emotion, with many interconnections among the brain 
areas responsible for belief assessment and option evaluation. 
These interconnections have been crucially effective for ena-
bling organisms to operate efficiently to survive and reproduce, 
but may lead to errors in the more complex world that people 
now inhabit. Valuing a situation as extremely desirable or unde-
sirable may produce a high degree of attention that is easily con-
fused with a high degree of credibility. 
  As with motivated inference, the best way to avoid de-
structive fear-driven inference is more akin to psychotherapy 
than informal logic. People need to be aware of natural tenden-
cies to exaggerate dreadful possibilities, and to ask themselves 
how much evidence actually exists for what they fear. The result 
should be increased ability to distinguish between arousal and 
credibility. Hence critical thinking can be improved, one hopes, 
by increasing awareness of the emotional roots of many infer-
ences.  
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5. Cognitive-Affective Maps 
Such roots can be explored using a technique for analyzing the 
emotional character of conflicts called cognitive-affective maps, 
or CAMs (Thagard 2010b, Findlay and Thagard forthcoming; 
Thagard 2011, forthcoming-a). Cognitive maps (also called con-
cept maps) have been used for decades to display the conceptual 
structure of important issues, but they do not display the large 
emotional, value-laden component of most disputes. In areas 
from social policy to environmental ethics, cognitive-affective 
maps can be a useful tool for helping people to understand the 
emotional roots of controversies. Psychologists use the term “af-
fect” to encompass emotions, moods, and motivations. 
  Consider, for example, debates about whether people 
ought to be vegetarians.  It is no doubt possible to analyze such 
debates as consisting of arguments pro and con, and when I 
teach environmental ethics I consider and evaluate such argu-
ments. But the reasons that lead people to become vegetarians 
reside in systems of interconnected values more than sentential 
structures. Figure 2 illustrates a pro-vegetarian view of the 
world including both positive values (indicated by ovals) and 
negative values (indicated by hexagons). The thickness of the 
lines in the ovals and hexagons represents the strength of the 
values. The supportive connections between concepts are indi-
cated by solid lines, and the conflictive connections are indi-
cated by dotted lines. By mapping the kinds of values shown in 
figure 2, one gets an understanding of the emotional coherence 
of the position, which can easily be contrasted with a more 
mainstream view that eating meat is not only acceptable but de-
sirable.  
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Figure 2. Cognitive-affective map showing the emotional val-
ues that support being a vegetarian. Ovals are positive values, 
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hexagons are negative values, solid lines are supportive connec-
tions, and dotted lines indicate incompatibility. 
 
  Figure 2 captures some of the main reasons why people 
become vegetarians, including love of animals and concerns 
with health, cost of eating, and maintenance of sustainable envi-
ronments. Such CAMs provide a concise picture of the overall 
values, both positive and negative, that support vegetarianism: 
vegetarians tend to be people who care about animals, health, 
and the environment, and dislike animal suffering, sickness, and 
degrading the environment. Figure 2 can naturally be fleshed out 
into a set of arguments for why one ought to be a vegetarian, but 
such arguments conceal that for many people deciding to be-
come a vegetarian is as much an emotional process as a purely 
cognitive one (Rozin, Markwith, and Stoess 1987). Figure 2 il-
lustrates how vegetarianism can be an emotionally coherent po-
sition. (For the theory of emotional coherence, see Thagard 
2000, 2006). 
  CAMS are easy to draw, and are made even easier by a 
software program called EMPATHICA that is freely available at 
 http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~pthagard/empathica.html.   
This program encourages people to draw CAMs not only of 
their own values but also of the values of people with whom 
they disagree, with the aim of increasing empathy in the sense of 
mutual understanding of emotional attitudes. The aims of critical 
thinking should include not only improving the deliberations of 
individuals but also improving social processes of conflict reso-
lution, and EMPATHICA is intended to be a step in that direc-
tion. 
  In a discussion of political ideologies, I have recently ex-
tended the CAM methodology to include non-linguistic repre-
sentations such as pictures and sounds (Thagard, forthcoming-
a). A more emotionally evocative version of figure 2 could be 
produced by adding pictures of valued objects such as cute baby 
seals that are associated with love of animals, as well as pictures 
of disgusting scenes such as slaughterhouses. Sounds are also 
relevant, such as the haunting communications of whales in con-
trast to the painful wails of confined cows.   
 
 
6. Scientific Literacy  
    
Campaigns for scientific literacy are often led by scientists or 
sociologists who are unaware of the psychological complexity 
of scientific knowledge. In addition to basic information about 
scientific theories, spreading scientific ways of thinking needs to 
include an understanding of the nature of scientific concepts and 
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other representations, as well as an appreciation of the motiva-
tional obstacles to science. As McCauley (2011) argues, relig-
ious thinking, which has existed as long as human civilization, is 
much more natural for people than scientific thinking, which 
only became systematic and sophisticated in the 17th century. I 
think that scientific literacy is an important part of critical think-
ing, because it is impossible to make reasonable judgments 
about such issues as the environment, technology, and economic 
development without appreciation of the content and methods of 
science. 
  The neuropsychological approach to critical thinking that I 
have been advocating has an analogous contribution to make to 
the project of scientific literacy, which needs to attend to: the 
structure of scientific knowledge, the nature of scientific think-
ing, and the sources of resistance to science, either in general or 
with respect to particular doctrines such as evolution and global 
warming. Scientific knowledge consists not only of sets of lin-
guistic propositions, but also of conceptual systems organized 
by kind and part-whole relations (Thagard 1992). Moreover, 
much scientific information is visual, as evident in the diagrams, 
photographs, graphs, and maps found in many articles and text-
books. Finally, scientific method is not fully captured by linguis-
tic prescriptions, but can also involve procedural knowledge 
about how to use instruments and conduct experiments (Sahdra 
and Thagard 2003). Hence the encouragement of scientific liter-
acy needs to be based not on the study of critical thinking in the 
tradition of informal logic, but rather on the cognitive science of 
science, which has an extensive literature (e.g. Carey 2000, Chi 
2005, Vosniadou 2008, Thagard forthcoming-b, Nersessian 
2008).   
 
 
7. Conclusion 
  
Because of the distinguished history running from Aristotle to 
Frege to Russell to contemporary formal logic, philosophers 
have tended to take deductive reasoning as the central model for 
inference. This model applies well to mathematical proofs, but 
has little relevance for understanding how people acquire beliefs 
and produce decisions. Research on informal logic comes closer 
to capturing how reasoning operates in many domains besides 
mathematics, but mostly retains the assumption that arguments 
are serial and linguistic. Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest 
that the study of argument is useless. Inferences do not have the 
same psychological structure as arguments, but arguments are an 
important part of communication of the evidential considera-
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tions that go into good inferences. Contrary to Mercier and 
Sperber (2011), I do not think that reasoning has a primary bio-
logical function just to convince people. Rather, I see arguments 
as a cultural development that may serve multiple purposes, in-
cluding both the selfish goal of getting the agreement of others 
and the social goal of transmitting information that everyone 
needs for forming reliable beliefs and making good decisions.  
The role of arguments in fixing beliefs and shaping decisions is 
thus psychologically indirect but socially significant. 
  Hence educators concerned with improving critical think-
ing should by all means continue to help students understand the 
difference between good and bad arguments. However, from a 
neuropsychological perspective, they should view the under-
standing of arguments as only part of the laudable enterprise of 
improving thought. Arguments provide a comprehensible way 
of structuring and communicating evidence, but their psycho-
logical impact depends on translating them into the kinds of 
multimodal, parallel, coherence-based considerations that pro-
duce inferences. Moreover, when arguments fail to convince, we 
should rarely look for the explanation in terms of the traditional 
fallacies, but rather in terms of the multitude of error tendencies 
that psychological research has shown to operate in human 
thinking. Similarly, the pursuit of scientific literacy needs to 
adopt a psychologically rich view of the structure of scientific 
knowledge and reasoning, along with a deeper understanding of 
the cognitive and emotional barriers to good scientific thinking. 
The poet Yeats said that education is not the filling of a pail, but 
the lighting of a fire. I take this to mean that all learning requires 
motivation, not just information acquisition. Correlatively, over-
coming false beliefs and bad decisions is not the emptying of a 
pail, but the extinguishing of some fires and the lighting of oth-
ers. Critical thinking requires the motivation to use what is 
known about cognitive and emotional mental processes to im-
prove inferences about what to believe and what to do.  
  
 
Appendix:  53 Error Tendencies 
An error tendency is a pattern of thinking that is natural for peo-
ple but frequently leads to errors in judgments about what to be-
lieve or decisions about what to do. The following list is from 
my old course on critical thinking, which provides further notes, 
http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/courses/phil145.html. The list derives 
primarily from Gilovich (1991), Schick and Vaughan (1999), 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989), and Bazerman (1994).  It in-
cludes a few familiar fallacies, e.g. post hoc propter hoc, but 
mostly is based on the psychological literature.  
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A. 29 Error Tendencies That Affect Inferences About What To 
Believe 
 
Clustering illusion: Tendency to see non-existent patterns in 
random events. 
Representativeness: Tendency to use assessments of similarity 
in statistical and causal reasoning. 
Spurious causal theories: Tendency to use unsupported causal 
theories in place of careful statistical and causal reasoning. 
Regression fallacy: Tendency for people's predictions to ignore 
that many statistical effects regress to the mean. 
Vividness: Tendency for information that is particularly salient 
or emotionally charged to be given undue influence. 
Confirmation bias: Tendency to seek information that supports 
your views and to ignore information that contradicts them. 
The problem of absent data: Tendency to be over-confident 
about conclusions despite the absence of relevant informa-
tion. 
Self-fulfilling prophecies: Tendency for expectations to affect 
the world in ways that make the expectation true. 
Gambler's fallacy: Tendency to view chance as a self-
correcting process in which a deviation in one direction is 
corrected in the opposite direction, e.g. expecting tails after a 
string of heads. 
Ambiguity: Tendency to interpret ambiguous (more than one 
meaning) information in ways that fit our preconceptions. 
Vagueness: Tendency to interpret vague (no clear meaning) in-
formation in ways that fit our preconceptions. 
Asymmetric recall: Tendency to remember only one side of a 
situation, e.g. the unpleasant side. 
Overconfidence in your judgment: Tendency to fail to collect 
key factual information because of being too sure of assump-
tions and opinions. 
Insufficient anchor adjustment: Tendency to let an arbitrary 
starting point bias a final answer. 
Hindsight bias: Tendency to misremember your earlier attitudes 
based on later knowledge of outcomes. 
Motivated inference: Tendency to reach conclusions unduly 
influenced by favorable personal goals. 
Fear-driven inference: Tendency to reach conclusions because 
of arousal produced by fear.  
Sharpening and leveling in communication: Tendency to dis-
tort information in social contexts because of simplifying, 
faulty memory, or reformulating what was told. 
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Motivated communication distortions: Tendency to distort 
information in social contexts for purposes of entertainment, 
informativeness, or self-interest. 
False consensus: Tendency to overestimate the extent to which 
other people agree with you. 
Groupthink: Tendency for people working in groups to reach 
uncritical conclusions. 
Pluralistic ignorance: Tendency not to realize that other people 
have beliefs similar to yours. 
Bogus authority: Tendency to believe authorities when they are 
speaking outside their areas of expertise. 
Intuition: Tendency to form beliefs based on a feeling or sixth 
sense, without evaluation of evidence. 
Mystical experience: Tendency to form beliefs on the basis of 
an ineffable, personal, direct experience of reality. 
Denying the evidence:  Tendency to reject evidence rather than 
to abandon a favored hypothesis with which the evidence 
conflicts. 
Hasty generalization: Tendency to make a judgment about a 
group of things on the basis of evidence concerning only a 
few members of that group. 
Conjunction fallacy: Tendency to conclude that a conjunction 
(A&B) is more probable than one of the conjuncts (A). This 
occurs when the other conjunct (B) is highly representative or 
available. 
Post hoc ergo propter hoc: Tendency to infer that two events 
are causally related just because one happened after the other. 
 
 
B. 24 Error Tendencies That Affect Inferences About What To 
Do 
 
Plunging in: Beginning to gather information and reach conclu-
sions without thinking the issue through or thinking about 
how the decision should be made. 
Frame blindness: Tendency to solve the wrong problem be-
cause your mental framework prevents you from seeing the 
best options and important objectives. 
Inconsistent weighting of costs: Tendency to understand costs 
and losses differently in different situations, even when the 
costs and losses should be the same. 
Sunk costs: Tendency to make decisions on the basis of past 
investment rather than expected future value. 
Framing losses as more important than gains: Tendency to 
become risk seeking in order to avoid losses. 
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Bad metaphors or analogies: Tendency to frame a decision 
using metaphors or analogies that give a misleading under-
standing of the problem situation. 
Lack of frame control: Tendency to define the problem in only 
one way or to be unduly influenced by the frames of others. 
Overconfidence in judgment: Tendency to be too sure of as-
sumptions and opinions, leading to decisions made without 
collecting key information. 
Shortsighted shortcuts: Tendency to make decisions based on 
information acquired through lazy thinking strategies such as 
availability, anchoring, and confirmation bias. 
Shooting from the hip: Tendency to make decisions intuitively 
based on information in your head rather than following a 
systematic procedure for choosing such as a subjective linear 
model. 
Group failure: Tendency to assume that groups will make good 
choices automatically and to fail to manage the group deci-
sion-making process in ways that will produce better deci-
sions. 
Fooling yourself about feedback: Tendency to fail to learn 
from experience because of motivated inference or hindsight 
bias. 
Not keeping track: Tendency not to keep systematic records 
that would make it possible to learn from past decisions. 
Failure to audit your decision process: Tendency not to moni-
tor your decision making in an organized fashion that would 
identify errors. 
Mythical fixed pie: Tendency in negotiation to assume that 
your interests completely conflict with the other party's inter-
ests. 
Framing in negotiation: Tendency to distort negotiation by 
framing in terms of gains and losses. 
Excessive escalation of conflict: Tendency to make increas-
ingly extreme demands on the other party rather than seeking 
a settlement. 
Negotiator overconfidence: Tendency to overestimate the 
strength of your own negotiating position. 
Neglecting the cognitions of others; Tendency to focus on your 
own interests and forget about the interests and plans of the 
other party. 
Neglecting fairness: Tendency to ignore issues of fairness and 
concern for others. 
Winner's curse: Tendency in competitive bidding for the win-
ner to pay too high a price. 
Risky shift: Tendency for individuals in groups to produce risk-
ier decisions than would the individuals alone. 
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Tragedy of the commons: Tendency for pursuit of individual 
goals to lead to depletion of shared resources. 
Failure to cooperate: Tendency to maximize individual inter-
ests instead of cooperating with others. 
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